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Abstract. Despite the vast literature on the energy-efficiency gap, there is 
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of wealth growth-rate maximisation under uncertainty, subject to the 
diminishing marginal utility of retrofitting. The resulting model provides an 
unambiguous answer to the question of how much, and at what point in 
time, consumers with given wealth dynamics and parameters should invest 
in energy-efficiency measures for their particular dwelling. We treat in detail 
two foundational wealth dynamics: consumers who solely earn a fixed 
income, and those whose wealth grows multiplicatively. The differences in 
decision-making between these cases is seen to be substantial, with the 
latter group exhibiting further significant heterogeneity. All of this has 
profound implications for the social planner: on the one hand, we show how 
he must work harder to influence wealthier consumers; on the other, the 
model provides a methodology for crafting highly targeted policy 
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Despite the vast literature on the energy-eciency gap, there is a general dearth of in-
vestment models which incorporate the consumer’s temporal freedom in the investment
decision. Focusing on the building sector, we formulate optimal investment in energy e-
ciency as a problem of wealth growth-rate maximisation under uncertainty, subject to the
diminishing marginal utility of retrotting. The resulting model provides an unambiguous
answer to the question of how much, and at what point in time, consumers with given
wealth dynamics and parameters should invest in energy-eciency measures for their
particular dwelling. We treat in detail two foundational wealth dynamics: consumers who
solely earn a xed income, and those whose wealth grows multiplicatively. The dierences
in decision-making between these cases is seen to be substantial, with the latter group
exhibiting further signicant heterogeneity. All of this has profound implications for the
social planner: on the one hand, we show how he must work harder to inuence wealthier
consumers; on the other, the model provides a methodology for crafting highly targeted
policy interventions.
Keywords: the energy-eciency gap; energetic building retrots; diminishing marginal
utility; investment under uncertainty; growth-rate maximisation; social planning; retrot
incentives.




1. Introduction and Background
The energy-eciency gap is commonly understood as the suggestion that the way individuals
make decisions about investing in energy eciency leads to a slower-than-optimal diusion
of conservation technology. In this article we contribute to the theoretical underpinnings of
this hypothesis by proposing a decision-making procedure for optimal investment in energy
eciency. We focus on a prototypical and salient example of the same, namely the energetic
retrot of a dwelling, and provide a denitive answer to a surprisingly non-trivial question:
“When and how much should a risk-neutral consumer invest in energy eciency?”
Although it is undeniable that only a minuscule share of the total building stock undergoes
meaningful energy retrots each year,
1
this fact on its own cannot constitute evidence for an
energy-eciency gap; an additional denition of optimal consumer behaviour is required. The
broad consensus in the literature is that a discounted cash ow analysis is the appropriate
method of investment appraisal. The debate surrounding the gap therefore tends to focus
on discount rates, transaction costs, performance deviation of the technology, behavioural
phenomena such as the rebound eect, and other such factors (Allcott & Greenstone, 2012;
Gerarden et al., 2017). That is, each of the variables, or missing variables, in a net-present-
value–type model is investigated, and discussion around the existence or size of the gap framed
in this context.
A critical drawback to using the above class of models for baselining the energy-eciency
gap is the following: a discounted cash ow appraisal simply cannot answer the basic question
of whether it is advantageous for the consumer to wait a year or two or ve before investing.
This matters greatly for the energy-eciency gap, since conservation technology, like any
other technology, is subject to a diusion process, and the consumer’s ability to put o an
investment to a later date is a fundamental degree of freedom in the description of this dynamic
unfolding. Another relevant, and as it turns out related, weakness of the discounted cash ow
model is that the burden of quantifying the investment risk typically falls on a single variable,
the discount rate, which consequently often becomes the most debated and prescient aspect
of the gap (Gillingham & Palmer, 2014). This substantially diminishes the usefulness of the
model as a baseline for optimal technological diusion, since discount rates are known to
1
In the EU, for instance, only around 0.2% of the building stock undergoes deep-energy retrots per annum
(Esser et al., 2019).
2
exhibit considerable heterogeneity (Newell & Siikamäki, 2015).
2
It is our contention that these
shortcomings make a discounted cash ow analysis unsuitable for use as a yardstick for optimal
consumer investment in energy eciency.
Given the overwhelming dominance in the literature of this type of model, alternative
proposals are hard to come by. A prominent attempt is that of Hassett and Metcalf (1992), who
simultaneously address both deciencies outlined in the previous paragraph with an innovative
retrot investment model based on real option theory. The main source of risk in such an
investment in their estimation, is the stochastic nature of the price of the energy carrier and the
cost of capital. Using mathematical machinery developed by McDonald and Siegel (1986), who
quantify the real option of waiting to invest, Hassett and Metcalf prescribe a fuel-price trigger to
inform optimal investment. In a subsequent publication, they demonstrate that their model leads
to a slower diusion of conservation technology than a simple net-present-value–type decision
framework, and thereby make a case against the existence of a pervasive energy-eciency gap
(Hassett & Metcalf, 1993). We discuss their work in some detail in an appendix to this article.
Despite their dierences, the above expected-utility investment model does hold one central
assumption in common with a discounted-cash-ow analysis, namely, that the consumer seeks
to minimise the net present value of their heating expenses. But this is not the only possible
framing of the investment problem. A notable alternative is found in the nance literature,
where the long-run wealth of the investor is maximised via a logarithmic utility function.3 We
shall see in this article how this method, when combined with the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility in retrotting, provides an unambiguous solution to our motivating question of
how much a risk-neutral consumer should optimally invest in energy eciency, and when. An
additional benet of this method is a natural integration of the consumer’s wealth parameters
into the investment problem.
We were nevertheless led us to ask if there was not a larger framework within which we
could situate this calculation. We discovered just such a schema in ergodicity economics (Peters,
2019), which has enjoyed much success in resolving long-standing microeconomic puzzles in
an integrated, fundamental way (Adamou et al., 2020; Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016; Peters, 2011a,
2011b). The approach seeks to provide new foundations for utility theory, among which is
2
Conversely, appealing to this heterogeneity to explain the energy-eciency gap simply begs the question
(Jae & Stavins, 1994a).
3
This approach was in fact central to the development of utility theory, and enjoys a long and fascinating
history (MacLean et al., 2011; Peters, 2011b).
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the axiom that the consumer’s specic utility function is related to the growth rate of their
wealth, and can be derived from the specied wealth dynamic. Accordingly, a logarithmic utility
function corresponds to wealth that is growing exponentially; in contrast, for a consumer with
an additive wealth dynamic, i.e. one who only earns a xed income, cost minimisation is in fact
equivalent to growth-rate maximisation.
In this article therefore, we show how optimal investment in energy eciency can be
formulated as a problem of wealth-growth-rate maximisation. The resulting model is rich in
economic and policy insight, demonstrating not only how consumers dier in their decision
making as a result of their wealth dynamic, but further that the social planner’s task of in-
centivising the take-up of energy eciency will dier markedly according to the consumer’s
wealth and wealth dynamic. Answering the question of optimal retrot depth, i.e. investment
size, required us to mathematically formalise the concept of diminishing marginal utility of
energy retrotting (Galvin, 2010) and quantify its implications for investment strategy. To the
best of our knowledge, this article is the rst to do so.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 contains a brief treatment of diminishing marginal utility
in retrotting. In the section following, we discuss how uncertainty enters the investment
decision, and introduce the relevant concepts from ergodicity economics. We bring these
preliminaries together in section 4, where we frame the growth-rate-maximisation problem.
Section 5 is a numerical proof of concept. We conclude in section 6.
Related literature.
It is naturally with the work of Hassett and Metcalf (1992) and related literature, i.e. prescriptive
investment-decision models concerned with technological adoption, that we most closely
identify our contribution (e.g. Sunding & Zilberman, 2001; Grenadier & Weiss, 1997). On the
other hand, descriptive models of technology diusion abound; Geroski (2000) provides an
overview of the literature. The most relevant example of the same is by Jae and Stavins (1994b),
authors of an extremely inuential summary (Jae & Stavins, 1994a) of the economic theory
underlying the energy-eciency gap. More recent surveys of the discourse around the gap
can be found in the widely-cited articles by Gerarden et al. (2017) and Gillingham and Palmer
(2014).
Other retrot-investment decision tools of varying scope and potential for scalability exist
in the literature. A typical application of the real option framework (McDonald & Siegel, 1986)
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to a single building is the simulation model of Kumbaroğlu and Madlener (2012). Articles
by Gabrielli and Ruggeri (2019) and Hong et al. (2014) are exemplary of the large class of
decision support models with specic foci (here, large building portfolios and multi-family
housing complexes respectively). Friege and Chappin (2014) and Ma et al. (2012) review this
vast literature.
Finally, a detailed treatment of the history and theory of long-run wealth maximisation via
the logarithmic utility function can be found in the book edited by MacLean et al. (2011). The
article by Pirvu and Žitković (2009) is exemplary of the questions in this eld that continue to
stimulate research in nance.
2. The Diminishing Marginal Utility of Retrot Investments
It is a straightforward consequence of building physics and economic reality that investments
in energy eciency diminish in marginal utility. Consider thermal insulation, the quintessential
retrot measure: building physics tells us that the energy saved increases linearly with the
thickness of the insulation; ceteris paribus, this means that each x% increase in insulation
thickness reduces energy loss through that medium by x%; but as the x% increase in insulation
thickness is absolute, whereas the x% decrease is relative to the energy consumption before
the new insulation was added on, it is clear that we have diminishing marginal energy savings
for increasing insulation thickness. Colloquially, “the rst centimetre of insulation is the most
important”. See Galvin (2012) for a further discussion of the non-linearity in retrot costs.
To capture this concept, we assume that the energy saved post-retrot s (kWh/m
2
/yr) as a
function of retrot cost k (€/m
2
) has the form of a classic diminishing-marginal-utility function:
s(k) ⋅⋅= s1k − s2k
2
, (1)
for constants s1, s2 > 0. In the case of retrotting, we usually have s1 ≫ s2 > 0; see table 1.
We make a few mathematical observations. The function s(k) is maximised for km
⋅
⋅= s1/(2s2),





/(4s2), and begins to decrease after this point. This decrease is
not physically sensible, so we must restrict the domain of our function to [0, km].
4
This is of
course in keeping with the intuition of diminishing marginal utility; in fact, it is straightforward
to demonstrate that on this domain the conditions s1, s2 > 0 are necessary and sucient to
4
When tting real data, this eectively reduces the number of degrees of freedom from two to one.
5
guarantee both that s(k) is positive, and that it satises the assumption of diminishing marginal




The variable s is in a one-to-one relationship with thermal standards for dwellings, usually
advertised by their expected nal-energy consumption, e.g. 45 kWh/m
2
/yr for a Passivhaus for
heating and hot-water usage (Georges et al., 2012). Indeed, s is exactly equal to the dierence
between the initial nal-energy consumption and the thermal standard to which the con-
sumer chooses to renovate, with higher standards, and hence higher energy savings, incurring
increasing marginal costs.
It is obvious that it is not possible to retrot with arbitrary precision. That is, there are
usually only a handful of retrot options available to the consumer: she may have the choice
of adding 8 cm of insulation to her roof, or increasing that to 12 cm and installing basement
insulation too, and so on (see table 2). We assume here that the domain and range of s(k) are
subsets of ℝ so that we can carry out standard algebraic manipulations. It will become clear
that this assumption does not aect the conclusions of our analysis in any meaningful way.
3. Energy Eciency Investments and Uncertainty
In order to introduce a stochastic element into the analysis, we take as a starting point the
central assumption in Hassett and Metcalf (1992), with which we are in agreement, that the
chief source of uncertainty in energy eciency investments is the price of the energy carrier.
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Suppose then that the price pt of the fuel that the consumer uses for heating follows a
geometric Brownian motion with trend  and variance  > 0,
dpt /pt =  dt +  dzt , (2)
where zt is a standard Wiener process with mean zero and unit variance. To simplify the
discussion we will assume that  > 0 throughout. Now in order to work with this stochastic
process, it is necessary to somehow remove the randomness to discover what happens “on
average”. But this turns out to be more challenging than one might suspect, and the consequent
divergent denitions of averaging lie at the heart of ergodicity economics. What follows is
the briefest of summaries of these ideas, restricted to geometric Brownian motion and the two
5
Hassett and Metcalf assume further that the cost of capital also follows a geometric Brownian motion. We
avoid this assumption, which does not aect our argument, in order to simplify the presentation. See also the
discussion in section 6.
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wealth dynamics that we will consider in this article.
Consider that there are at least two ways of computing what happens to pt as time passes.
On the one hand, its expectation value at time t is given by
E [pt ] = p0 exp t , (3)
whence we would conclude that the price of the fuel grows exponentially at rate . But it is
possible to compute another growth rate, namely that of the logarithm of pt ,
E [log pt ] = log p0 + ( − 
2
/2) t . (4)
From this equation, one would again conclude that the fuel price grows exponentially, but now
with rate  − 
2
/2. The existence of these two growth rates for the same stochastic process
is a fundamental result of Itô calculus, and is universally employed to estimate returns in
nance (Hull, 2017). Its explanation is usually couched in terms of the non-commutativity of
the log and expected-value operators, or as the dierence between the arithmetic and geometric
means of the multiplicative process pt . For ergodicity economics however, this phenomenon
is an example of ergodicity breaking (Peters & Klein, 2013), and forms the cornerstone of the
argument for a new axiom of economic decision-making (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016).
The rate  computed in equation 3 is the familiar average growth rate over the ensemble
of all possible realisations of the process pt . On the other hand, the rate  − 
2
/2 computed
in equation 5 answers the question, “what happens to any single realisation of this stochastic
process as time passes?”. One way to see this is as follows. If we rearrange equation 5 to isolate












that is, the growth rate can be thought of as being computed from the observable (log pt /p0)/t .
This particular observable turns out to be ergodic, i.e. its expectation value equals its time
average (Peters & Gell-Mann, 2016).
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This means that by denition, the expectation value of
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f (!(t)) dt =
∫
Ω
f (!)ℙ(!) d! . (6)
On the left is the time average of f , and on the right, its expectation value (Peters, 2019).
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(log pt /p0)/t , which is constant in time, is observed with probability one in any single, suciently
long, random sample of the process pt .
We come to the rst premise of ergodicity economics for optimal decision-making under
uncertainty: for an individual contemplating a stochastic investment opportunity, the average
over an innite ensemble is often irrelevant; what matters in the long run is the time-average
growth rate of a single realisation of the random process. This is computed via an ergodic
growth rate function.
The second premise of the decision axiom of ergodicity economics is that a consumer acts so
as to maximise the growth rate of her wealth. A consequence of this axiom is a natural denition
of the consumer’s utility function. To build intuition, we consider the two foundational cases:
the multiplicative and additive wealth dynamics. In the rst is assumed that the decision-
maker’s wealth is continuously reinvested at return  so that the increase in her wealth after a
passage of time Δt is given by
w(t + Δt) = w(t) exp Δt . (7)
In the additive dynamic in contrast, the consumer simply earns a xed income per unit time r ,
and does not reinvest her wealth, so that wealth grows as
w(t + Δt) = w(t) + rΔt . (8)
In each case, there is a natural growth rate of wealth, and extracting it calls for dierent








while for the additive we compute
r =
w(t + Δt) − w(t)
Δt
. (10)
We see that the growth rate in the multiplicative dynamic is in fact computed from a logarith-
mic function of the wealth; ergodicity economics argues that this provides a rst-principles
explanation for the logarithmic utility function (Peters, 2011b, cf. MacLean et al., 2011). In
8
contrast, the additive dynamic corresponds to a linear utility function. We restrict ourselves to
these cases in this article, but more complicated wealth dynamics are of course possible, and
each dynamic corresponds to a utility function; appendix B contains an illustrative example.
Given these ideas, we can state the decision axiom of ergodicity economics: the consumer
acts so as to maximise the time-averaged growth rate of their wealth under the specied wealth
dynamic.7 The connection to our topic of interest, investments in energy eciency, consists in
recognising that energy expenses are a “drag” on the wealth growth rate, a drag which may be
eased by investing in conservation technology.
A nal point of interest, given the prominence of the discount rate in the energy-eciency
gap debate, is that the above decision axiom has been framed free of any discount function:
it is a remarkable result of ergodicity economics that the proper discount function is in fact
automatically specied once the wealth dynamic and decision time-frame are xed (Adamou et
al., 2020; see also appendix B).
4. Investment in Energy Eciency as a Problem of Wealth Growth-Rate
Maximisation
Given these preliminaries, it is straightforward to formulate optimal investment in energy
eciency as a problem of maximising the growth-rate of wealth.
We assume rst of all that the consumer retrots “anyway” in cycles of L years (e.g. 25 years),
which may be thought of as the lifetime of the building insulation or heating system (Galvin,
2014). The consumer wishes to know if there exists some optimal investment time t
⋆
< L such
that her wealth growth-rate would be maximised if she invested at t
⋆
rather than letting the




In addition, given the assumption of diminishing marginal utility in retrotting, the con-
sumer is also looking for the optimal investment k
⋆
∈ [0, km], where the s(k) parameters s1 and
s2 are specic to her dwelling.
We further assume that all energy-carrier prices follow geometric Brownian motions. As
per the discussion in the previous section, we dene the action of the time-average operator
7
Whether decision-making in the real world proceeds according to this axiom is the subject of active research,
with promising initial results (Meder et al., 2020; Peters, 2019).
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T[⋅] on a geometric Brownian motion (pt , ,  ) as
T [pt ] ∶= p0 exp t , (11)
where  ⋅⋅=  − 
2
/2 is then the eective trend of the fuel price (see equation 5).
Finally, we allow that the consumer might wish to upgrade, at cost ℎ, her boiler with
eciency  to one with eciency  > , including a possible switch of the energy carrier from
one with current price and eective trend (p0, ) to another with parameters (q0, ).
The multiplicative wealth dynamic.
In the case of the multiplicative wealth dynamic, since all wealth is reinvested at return  , we
compute the net future value of the energy expenses and the retrot investment using this rate
(cf. Adamou et al., 2020). If the consumer makes her decision at time t , and the lifetime of the
new equipment is again L, the relevant future reference point becomes L + t . The consumer’s
expenses stream is then divided into three logical parts. First we have the net future value of























where we introduce the consumer’s per-square-meter nal-energy need u. Then, the per-
































Assuming now that the consumer starts o with wealth w0, the growth rate of wealth in



































 −  )]
, (15)
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where a is the heated area of the dwelling in square meters.
It is this growth rate that the consumer seeks to maximise.
8
We see that the consumer’s
wealth parameters w0 and  are naturally integrated into the optimisation problem.
The additive wealth dynamic.
In the case of the additive wealth dynamic, the linear utility function means that there is no
discounting of future costs (Adamou et al., 2020). The sum of the time-averaged energy costs







































Hence from equation 10, we can write the growth rate of the consumer’s wealth over the
relevant time period as
ga(k, t) = r −
a

















Maximising this function is the same as minimising the subtrahend, i.e. minimising the an-
nualised total expenses on energy for heating.
9
We see that in contrast to the case of the
multiplicative wealth dynamic, reference to the consumer’s wealth has disappeared, and the
growth rate r is also irrelevant for optimisation. We address this conceptual challenge in section
6.
Features of the solution.
We consider the multiplicative and additive cases together in discussing the solution to the




) maximising the growth
rates gm and ga is guaranteed since they are continuous functions on a bounded domain. How-
8
Note that in order for the problem to be well-dened, we must have the argument of the logarithm be greater
than unity, which simply translates to the reasonable requirement that the total costs (energy plus retrot) up to
time L + t not exceed the total wealth accumulated by that point.
9
This is the the derivation of what was claimed in the introduction, namely, that the expected-utility and
net-present-value models assume a linear utility function.
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ever, given their analytical complexity, closed-form solutions to the growth-rate–maximisation
problem could not be located. This is ultimately no great loss for the practicability of our
framework, since the optimisation problem is numerically tractable. Nonetheless, in this section
we present the features of the solution that could be determined analytically, in order that
the behaviour of the growth-rate functions may be understood to the greatest extent possible.
In particular, we examine the conditions under which we expect to nd non-trivial solutions,




We begin with the optimal investment size k
⋆
. Due to the assumption of diminishing
marginal utility, there exists a unique optimal investment k
⋆
< km for each moment in time t ,






























The expressions lend themselves to intuitive interpretation: as the fuel price or its trend
increases, or as the cost of renovation or the eciency of the new heater decreases, k
⋆
gets
larger, approaching its upper bound km = s1/(2s2) asymptotically. The expressions correctly
contain no reference to the previous energy carrier. Further, we see that k
⋆
> 0, i.e an optimal
investment in insulation exists, if and only if the expression in parentheses is positive. This can




























For ease of terminology, we refer to the above as the “qmin-criterion”. If the set of constants
in the functions ga and gm are positive, which is the usual case and which we will assume
throughout in what follows, the strictest possible lower bound on q0 corresponds to taking limit
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Recall that the consumer’s total investment is always a ⋅ (k
⋆
+ ℎ); this means that if k
⋆
= 0, we can only
conclude that the consumer should not invest in insulation. She may still invest in energy eciency by upgrading




t → 0, and the laxest to taking the limit t → L, in equations 21 and 22. That is, if q0 > qmin(0),
the new fuel is expensive enough to make an investment in insulation worthwhile no matter
the value of t
⋆
; on the other hand, if q0 < qmin(L), the new fuel is cheap enough that insulation
is not economically viable, no matter the value of t
⋆
.
Given the above solutions k
⋆
(t) to the insulation-depth problem, we have two cases: either
the qmin-criterion is satised, or it is not. We accordingly have the following pair of results for
the additive dynamic, the proofs of which are given in appendix A.
Proposition 1. If the set of constants in the wealth growth-rate ga are such that the qmin,a-
criterion is not satised, then k⋆ = 0 and the consumer should not invest in insulation. The optimal
investment time t⋆ to upgrade her heating system at cost a ⋅ ℎ is given by the implicit equation
p0 =

















 (ℎ − q0u (e
L
− 1) (L − 1))
Lu
, (24)
the consumer should invest immediately; conversely, if
p0 <




− 1) (2L − 1))
u (e
L
(2L − 1) + 1)
, (25)
she should not invest at all.
Proposition 2. If the set of constants in the wealth growth-rate ga are such that the qmin,a-criterion
is satised, the optimal investment time t⋆ for a consumer to upgrade her heating system and
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the consumer should invest the amount a ⋅ (k⋆
a






























(2L − 1) + 1)
, (28)
she should not invest at all.
The unwieldy expressions in these propositions perhaps mask the intuitive nature of the
result: if the current energy carrier is expensive enough (equations 25 and 28) it is benecial
to undertake an energy-eciency investment according to either equation 23 or 26. That is,
propositions 1 and 2 are the resolution to the motivating question of this article in the case of
the additive dynamic.
Corresponding results exist in the multiplicative case, but these could only be numerically
studied; the equivalent algebraic expressions are unfortunately analytically intractable (see
appendix A).
The role of the social planner.
Consider now that the function ga contains 12 relevant degrees of freedom. It is helpful for
our purposes to divide these 12 into two sets: a rst set of ve, {a, L, u, , }, describing the
immutable physical aspects of the consumer’s dwelling and equipment, and a second set of
seven, {p0, , q0, , s1, s2, ℎ}, describing parameters over which the consumer has no control,
but which the social planner may control to some degree.
11
The above propositions imply that
if two constraints, namely the qmin-constraint plus one of equations 25 or 28, are satised, a
non-trivial solution to the optimisation problem exists, and consumer sees incentive to retrot.
In the case of multiplicative dynamics, a similar statement holds, except that there a total of
three constraints are required to completely specify the solution to the optimisation problem
(see appendix A). We hence have the following result.
Corollary 1. For the social planner to be able to maximise the growth-rate function gm (resp. ga)
at a tuple (k⋆, t⋆) of his choosing, it is necessary that the set of parameters {p0,,q0,,s1,s2, ℎ}
allows him at least three (resp. two) of degrees of freedom.
This result qualies the intuition that if the fuel and retrot prices and trends can be changed
arbitrarily, any desired goal can be achieved: in point of fact, the social planner needs to pull
11
Although s1 and s2 depend on physical characteristics of the dwelling, we include them here since they could
be changed by introducing subsidies on energetic retrots.
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exactly two levers in the additive case (increasing for example the energy-carrier price trends
 and  via a carbon tax), and three in the multiplicative (increasing  and  via a tax, and
reducing the cost of retrotting s1 via a subsidy, say). That the social planner has to pull a whole
extra lever to inuence the decision-making of consumers with multiplicatively-growing wealth
is a non-trivial result, which simply falls out of the mathematics of growth-rate maximisation.
It conrms the idea that a wealthier consumer is harder to inuence than a one less well-o:
the wealth dynamic of the wealthier consumer corresponds to a utility function which is simply
more robust against changes in the environment.
The eectiveness of these policy instruments are is another matter entirely. Mathematically,
this involves comparing derivatives: for instance, the relative sizes of )g/) and )g/)s1 could be
used to give a rough indication of the eectiveness of a carbon tax relative to a subsidy scheme
in generating consumer incentive. We expound on these points in the discussion in section 6.
5. Case Study: German Single Family Dwelling
By way of example, consider the parameters in table 1 for a typical single-family home built in
Germany between 1979–1983, which currently relies on an older oil boiler for heat. The retrot
measures used to estimate the parameters s1 and s2 are listed in table 2. We list the parameters
for the various options for an upgrade of the heating system, along with arbitrarily selected
eective price trends  for the corresponding energy carriers.
The additive wealth dynamic.
To understand the mechanics of the optimisation problem, let us begin in the simpler case of
additive dynamics, and further imagine that the consumer only has a single choice for her new
energy carrier, say gas. We leave the price parameters {p0, , q0, } unspecied for the moment.
Given the dwelling and heating-system parameters in tables 1 and 3, and additionally setting
 = 0.02, we rst compute qmin,a(t); this curve is depicted in gure 1. If a (q0, t) tuple lies in the
shaded region depicted in the gure, k
⋆
a
(t) will be positive.
Next, consider gure 2, which depicts the surface r − ga(k, t), i.e. the annualised energy
expenses, for dierent values of p0 and q0, where we set (, ) = (0.01, 0.02); also depicted is the
point on the surface where energy expenses are minimised. For the consumer, this highlighted
point is the precise answer to the question, “how much should I invest in energy eciency and
15
Table 1. Physical retrot parameters for a typical single-family home built in Germany between 1979–
1983, obtained from the episcope database of representative buildings in the European Union (Loga et
al., 2016). In the expression for , the denominator 1.67 is the energy-expenditure coecient and includes
the eciency of the heating system and any transmission losses. Note also the intuitive interpretation
of the t constant s1: it is the cost of saving a kilowatt-hour of nal energy consumption per year.
Physical Parameters of Dwelling
Description Variable Value Unit
Retrot cycle L 25. yrs
Heated area a 142. m
2
Final-energy need u 108.9 kWh/m
2
Heater eciency  1/1.67 –
Energy carrier – Oil –
Max. retrot investment km 257.4 €/m
2
Max. nal-energy saved sm 55. kWh/m
2
/yr
s(k) t constant s1 0.38 (kWh/yr)/€






Table 2. Example combinations of retrot measures, in increasing order of price, with corresponding
reductions in nal-energy need for the dwelling described in table 1. The data were obtained from
a freely-available retrot calculator developed by Bosch Thermotechnik GmbH and the Fraunhofer
Institute for Building Physics IBP. (Available at https://www.ezienzhaus-online.de/sanierungsrechner/.
Last accessed 10.12.2020.)







Roof Basement External wall Windows
– – – – 0. 0.
8 – – – 14.4 13.2
8 4 – – 33.3 19.1
8 4 8 – 150.9 31.1
8 4 8 Double glazing 206.9 43.1
28 4 8 Double glazing 231. 49.1
28 12 16 Double glazing 257.4 55.
16
Table 3. Typical options for a heating system upgrade. Analogous to table 1, the denominator in the
“eciency” column is the energy-expenditure coecient. Note that in the case of electricity, the eciency
is the coecient of performance of the heat pump, which is greater than unity.
Heating System Upgrade Options
Energy carrier Parameters
Investment Eciency

























Additive Dynamics, Upgrade to Gas-Fired Boiler: q0 − t Plane
Figure 1. The curve is equation 22, with the parameters taken from tables 1 and 3, and additionally





















































(p0, q0) = (4, 5) : Immediate Heater Upgrade
Figure 2. Depicted here are the annualised expenses for heating energy from equation 18, r − ga(k, t), in
four dierent cases, with (, ) = (0.01, 0.02). These expenses are minimised at the point indicated in red.
The title of each gure gives the (p0, q0) tuple in cents/kWh; the remaining parameters come from tables
1 and 3. The axis labels k, t and r − ga have units €/m
2
, “years from present time”, and €/yr respectively.
Clockwise from the top-left, the rst three gures have q0 < qmin,a(L), and illustrate the three cases in
proposition 1. Finally, the gure in the bottom-right is an illustration of the general case, equation 28 in
proposition 2.
when?”.
Simultaneously, gure 2 is an illustration of corollary 1 in action. The top-left scenario is
one in which neither the qmin,a-criterion nor equation 25 are satised. Proceeding clockwise
from this case we see how, since all other variables are held xed, increasing p0 alone is enough
to ensure that equation 25 is satised (top-right scenario), and if increased still further (bottom-
right scenario), that equation 24 is fullled. But to now get from this scenario to one in which
the consumer has incentive to additionally invest in energy-eciency measures requires that
social planner introduce another degree of freedom (here, q0) in order that the qmin,a-bound




) of the social
planner’s choosing.
In the general case, our consumer has several choices for a new energy carrier. She should
proceed by computing g
⋆
a
for each energy carrier (q0, ), including the case (q0, ) = (p0, ) for
the insulation-only option, and rank-order them; her optimal investment strategy is the one
that results in the lowest annualised energy costs. An example calculation is presented in table
18
Table 4. Numerically-obtained solutions to the optimisation problem specied by tables 1 and 3 in the
case of additive wealth dynamics, for the fuel parameters listed below. The status-quo parameters (p0, )
are the same as those in the “insulation-only” row. The optimal investment strategy (lowest annualised
energy costs) is highlighted.
Additive Dynamics, Example Investment Decision
Energy carrier scenario Optimisation result
Energy carrier Price parameters
Price Price trend Min. annul.
energy expenses
Opt. invest. Opt. invest.
time












Insul. only 4 0.01 1785.1 0. 0.
Oil 4 0.01 1599.9 0. 0.
Gas 9 0.02 3356.4 102.6 17.0
Elec. 23 0.015 2951.1 47.3 22.6
4. We see that the best strategy for the given set of constants is an immediate investment in a
new oil boiler, with no further investment in insulation.
The multiplicative wealth dynamic.
We turn now to the multiplicative dynamic, where the growth rate function gm(k, t) contains
express reference to the wealth parameters w0 and  . It is an interesting and essential feature
of this function that it is ill-dened if the argument of the logarithm in the expression (equation
15) is negative; this imposes an immediate restriction on w0 and  : they must both be large
enough, relative to each other, to ensure that the argument of the logarithm remains positive.
We hence restrict ourselves to the upper wealth quantiles in Germany for the calculation
presented in table 5, where we show how the same physical parameters result in starkly dierent
optimal investment decisions depending on w0 and  .
12
If one looks along a given row (i.e. for




increases; i.e. the consumer should
invest less and later, the faster her wealth grows. On the other hand, if one looks down a given




increase, though the increase in k
⋆
is far less signicant (cf. equation 19). That is, the wealthier consumer should invest slightly
more, but at a signicantly later point in time.
12
As corollary 1 species, three degrees of freedom were required to generate table 5.
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Table 5. Numerically-obtained solutions to the optimisation problem specied by table 1 for an upgrade
to a heat pump (i.e. oil to electricity) in the case of multiplicative wealth dynamics. Various wealth
scenarios are considered. The fuel price parameters, listed in the title of the table in the units we have
been using throughout, were chosen (cf. corollary 1) so that non-trivial solutions resulted.
Multiplicative Dynamics, Optimal Investment in a Heat Pump

































6. Policy Implications and Outlook
In this article, we have presented a novel investment-decision model that answers the question
“when and how much should a risk-neutral consumer invest in energy eciency?” Our frame-
work can be readily employed to model the diusion of energy-eciency technology in the
absence of market barriers, thereby generating a baseline against which an energy-eciency
gap may be measured.
We address here a perceived shortcoming of the preceding calculation, namely, that the
model appears to be less prescriptive in the additive case than in the multiplicative because the
wealth parameters in the former case drop out. This turns out to not be a shortcoming of the
model, but rather of the additive dynamic itself, which is an extremely simplied description of
wealth growth. In appendix B, we derive the utility function and growth rate for a more realistic
wealth dynamic: a consumer one who earns a xed income while regularly saving a portion
of wealth. Instead of the linear utility function of the additive dynamic we obtain a mixed
log-linear utility function, and in contrast to a strict “no discounting”, we derive a power-law
discount function (see gure 3). The optimisation problem as described in section 4 considered
for this wealth dynamic will now be a function of the consumer’s wealth parameters instead
of independent of them, as in the additive case. We see the application of our framework to
dierent wealth dynamics as an exciting avenue of research.
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Indeed, the rst main policy takeaway is that heterogeneity in consumer decision-making,
down to the very form of the discount function itself, can be understood as stemming from
underlying wealth dynamics. This knowledge empowers the social planner to model the eects
of policy instruments along multiple dimensions in novel ways. For instance, in contrast
to the dominant discounted-cash-ow approach, where the burden of explaining consumer
heterogeneity falls almost exclusively on a single variable, the hard-to-measure discount rate
(Newell & Siikamäki, 2015; Allcott & Greenstone, 2012; Jae & Stavins, 1994b), modelling policy
measures in our framework relies instead on household wealth data and dynamics, which are
usually readily available (e.g. Deutsche Bundesbank, 2019).
A second immediate implication for policy planning comes from corollary 1, where we
demonstrated that the social planner must deploy additional policy measures to generate
investment incentive for consumers, typically wealthier, whose wealth grows multiplicatively
as compared to those whose wealth grows additively; table 5 further showed how consumers
within the multiplicative case itself can dier signicantly in their decision-making due to
their specic wealth parameters. These ideas can be extended and generalised to other, more
realistic, wealth dynamics, such as the one described in appendix B, so that the workings of
policy instruments can be better dierentiated both between and within wealth quantiles.
Another aspect of corollary 1 that bears highlighting is the lower bound on the number
of policy levers that the social planner must exercise to generate a desired level of consumer
incentive. Considering again the set of seven variables {p0, , q0, , s1, s2, ℎ} ostensibly within
the planner’s sphere of inuence, it is clear in reality, he should expect to have far fewer than
seven degrees of freedom. For instance, if we consider the two classic policy levers of a carbon
tax and retrot subsidies, the planner will be left with just three degrees of freedom, since the
four fuel-price parameters {p0, , q0, } will typically move in tandem in response to a carbon
tax,
13
and the retrot parameters s1 and s2 are jointly inuenced by subsidies. Once again,
extensions of this article to more complex wealth dynamics will reveal both if the number of
policy levers is sucient, and the extent to which they need to move independently from each
other, in order to generate retrot incentive for dierent wealth quantiles. Targeted and creative
policy instruments can be thereby conceived and implemented. As an example, the German
government recently began to oer steep discounts on the upgrade of heating systems (BMWi,
13
Except of course if the consumer is upgrading to an electric heating system, in which case q0 and  are
unaected by a carbon tax.
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2021): in our framework, this can be interpreted as the social planner taking advantage of the
fact that the cost of the heating system ℎ can be subsidised independently of retrot-measure
costs s1 and s2.
We turn now to the other key assumption in our model, namely, diminishing marginal
utility in retrotting. Our formalisation of this economic and physical reality, and subsequent
discovery of an optimal retrot depth for given dwelling and wealth parameters, provides a
quantitative method of corroborating the observed fact that consumers everywhere do invest in
shallow and medium retrot measures, while resisting deep retrots (Esser et al., 2019). Table
5 indicated strikingly that even the very wealthy may not stand to gain by retrotting to the
maximum thermal standard possible.
Our decision framework may also be used for other analytical exercises, such as locating
the Pareto-optimum level of greenhouse gas emissions due to heating (Garcia, 2017), with the
consumer’s utility function specied by the wealth dynamic (see appendix B). The socially-
optimal level of subsidies for retrotting can be similarly determined (Allcott & Greenstone,
2012). Additionally, we indicated in section 4 how the derivatives of the growth rate function
can be used to compare the eectiveness of dierent policy instruments.
Finally, at the macroeconomic level, our investment criterion can form the basis of a
representative-agent diusion model. For instance, since our framework can be used to model
the diusion of energy eciency technology in the absence of market barriers, increasing the
trend in fossil-fuel prices to mimic a carbon tax would give an upper-bound on the eects
of such a tax on the uptake of conservation technology. Similar policy experiments could be
carried out, scenarios charted, and even optimisation problems framed.
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Appendix A. Proofs of Mathematical Results
We briey sketch the proofs of propositions 1 and 2, and corollary 1.
We consider the additive and multiplicative dynamics together, dierentiating by a sub-
script where necessary. Consider rst the case where the qmin-criterion is not satised. A
straightforward application of the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions (Kemp, 1978) reveals that in
order for g to attain a maximum for 0 < t < L, the following conditions must be satised:
)kg|k=0 =  , (29)
)tg|k=0 = 0 . (30)
Here  ≠ 0 is a constant. Eliminating  between the two equations gives us equation 23 (to
wit, one condition) for the additive growth function ga. Hence, the qmin-criterion together
with equation 23 determine the existence of a non-trivial solution to the optimisation problem.
On the other hand, eliminating  in the above system of equations for gm leads again to two
conditions instead of one,
14
leading to a total of three degrees of freedom. The expressions
here, and in the paragraph below, are too unwieldy to display in print, but are contained in a
Mathematica notebook which is available upon request.
On the other hand, if the qmin-criterion is not satised, locating a growth-rate-maximising
14






) requires rst of all solving the simultaneous equations
)kg = 0 , (31)
)tg = 0 , (32)








), one of the two second




































> 0 . (34)
It turns out that equation 33 is trivially satised in both the additive and multiplicative cases,
while equation 34 is only trivially satised in the additive case. Hence, we end up at the same
result as in the previous paragraph: two degrees of freedom in the additive case, and three in
the multiplicative.
Appendix B. Derivation of the Utility Function, Growth Rate and Dis-
count Function for a General Wealth Dynamic
We sketch, with recourse to an example, how one computes the utility function, growth rate
and discount function for a general wealth dynamic. The interested reader is referred to Peters
and Gell-Mann (2016) for further intuition and details.
We consider a non-trivial wealth dynamic, a hybrid of the additive and multiplicative cases:
a consumer with net annual income r who continually invests a share  < 1 of her wealth
(e.g. 20%) to grow at some annual rate  (e.g. 2%). That is, we have the recurrence relations
w(0) = w0 , (35)
w(n + 1) = w(n)e

+ (1 −  )w(n) + r , (36)


















(r + w0) − r

. (38)
Computing the growth rate and utility function.
In essence, the growth rate g is a quantity that we extract out of the wealth dynamic w(t) which
conveys time-independent information about the growth of our wealth. Intuitively, it must
therefore have units “something/time”. In the additive case the “something” is “dollars”, and in
the multiplicative it is “annual percentage growth”. For a general dynamic it may be something
more complicated; it is usually dicult to say simply by inspection. Indeed, although it is clear
that the consumer’s wealth in equation 37 grows over time, it is not obvious how the growth
rate should be dened.
But since we know that the growth rate must have units “something/time”, the following
procedure suces: we simply linearise the relation wt = w(t) to bring it to the form u(wt ) = gt
for g a constant; then u is the consumer’s utility function, and g is the growth rate of her wealth
per unit time t .
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This is easily seen to work in the additive and multiplicative cases:
wt = w0 + rt → u(wt ) = wt − w0 = rt , (39)
wt = w0e
t
→ u(wt ) = log
wt
w0
= t . (40)










− 1)  + 1) t , (41)





= t , (42)
which means that the growth rate is in fact approximated by . On the left-hand-side of the
equation, we see that the consumer’s utility function is a hybrid of the additive and dynamic
cases. Crucially, in contrast to the pure additive dynamic, optimal investment in energy
15
In practice, one accomplishes this by solving wt = w(t) for t and then reading o the constant; in other
words, we invert w(t). The invertibility of w(t) is guaranteed by the inverse function theorem as long as )tw(t) is
continuous and non-vanishing. Whether a closed-form expression for the inverse exists is of course another matter.
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eciency will not be simply a problem of cost minimisation (cf. equation 18), but will involve
the consumer’s wealth parameters.
Computing the discount function.
The calculation of the discount function for a given wealth dynamic within the framework
of ergodicity economics is detailed in Adamou et al. (2020). We briey sketch the argument.
Since the fundamental premise in ergodicity economics is that consumers should maximise the
growth-rate of their wealth, it is necessary to specify the time frame of the economic decision
in order to compute a discount function. This can be either xed or adaptive, where the former
corresponds to a decision that does not aect future choices, whereas in the latter, future choices
do in fact depend on the present decision. An energy-eciency investment corresponds to a
xed-time-frame decision, so we restrict ourselves to this case here.
Mathematically, the discount function is computed via a so-called riskless inter-temporal
payment problem (RIPP): the consumer is simply asked to compare two cash payments p1 < p2
to be received at times t1 < t2 respectively; she should choose the one which make her wealth
grow faster over the specied time frame. The horizon of the decision is t1, and the delay
between the two payments is t2 − t1. The discount function is that function which when applied
to the later payment p2 makes the consumer indierent between the payments p1 and p2.
We will stick to equation 38, the small- limit for w(t), in what follows. For the xed–time-
frame decision, we must compare the growth rate of the consumer’s wealth up to time of the
later payment t2 for each of the two payments. Wealth in each case grows to
16
w1(t2) = w(t2) + p1(1 + )
t2−t1
, (43)
w2(t2) = w(t2) + p2 , (44)








































The expressions are identical except for the term (1 + )
−(t2−t1)
, which we immediately identify
16
The derivation of the expression for the growth of p1 follows easily from equation 38 by setting r to zero.
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Figure 3. Parameter values:  = 0.02,  = 0.2. We see that the in contrast to the pure additive dynamic
where no discounting function exists, the power-law function we derived here leads to a more realistic
gentle discounting of money.
as the discount function; see gure 3 for a comparison with the additive and exponential cases.
The discount function (1 + )
−t
, in combination with the utility function in equation 42,
can now be straightforwardly used to formulate the growth-rate maximisation problem as in
section 4.
Appendix C. Revisiting the Expected-Utility Investment Model
Hassett and Metcalf situate their investment model within expected utility theory, which is the
standard framework for dealing with choice under uncertainty in economics. They formulate
the decision to invest in energy eciency as a problem of minimising the expected value of the
net present value of energy and retrot expenses. The mathematics is as follows.
Suppose that the consumer has some delivered-energy need
17
x , which she can reduce by
a factor  ∈ [0, 1] at cost k. We assume again that the price pt of the energy carrier that the
consumer uses for heating follows a geometric Brownian motion with trend  and variance 
(equation 2). The optimal time t to invest in energy eciency should then be chosen such that





















where  is the consumer’s discount rate. Hence, in this setup, “do not invest” corresponds to
17
We distinguish between delivered energy need x and nal-energy need u, which we used in the main text.
The two are related by x = u/.
27
the optimal t being innity.
18
The proposed solution, based on a model of irreversible investment by McDonald and Siegel

























> 1 . (49)
We briey outline the idea. Firstly, the expression ( − )k/(x) in equation 48, the so-called
Marshallian investment trigger, is obtained by setting the net-present value of the monetary
savings due to the reduced energy consumption minus the investment to null, and solving for




− k . (50)
The mathematics of real option theory requires that this price trigger be made larger by the
factor /( − 1) to account for the value of waiting due to the uncertainty in the path of the
fuel price. Notice that  → ∞ as  → 0, collapsing this investment rule to the Marshallian
criterion in the limit of zero uncertainty.
The result is plausible and the mathematics elegant, but equation 48 is unfortunately not a
solution to the optimisation problem posed in equation 47. The direct argument is as follows.





























+ p0(1 − )x
e
−(−)t
 −  )
, (51)
where for convergence of the latter integral the economically natural condition  >  is required.
We further employed Fubini’s theorem and equation 3. The right-hand side of equation 51 now
contains no reference to  . Hence, the proposed solution, equation 48, which does contain  ,
has no direct mathematical connection to the cost-minimisation problem.
A second, more intuitive, argument against equation 48 as a solution can also be formulated
from equation 51 above. A direct comparison of the Marshallian criterion, equation 50, and the
18
Note that the energy carrier is not switched here, though allowing for such a consideration is straightforward.
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real-option–derived equation 48 reveals that the former, by denition, simply leaves out the
energy expenses incurred up to the moment of investment. Hence, although the Marshallian
criterion is appropriate for the irreversible investment opportunity which McDonald and Siegel
(1986) consider, it is not directly applicable to the case at hand, where the consumer has a
continuous stream of expenses which could be staunched by making an investment in energy
eciency. Indeed, here the task becomes to check if if the three terms in the consumer’s cost
stream, equation 51, might conspire to produce a non-trivial optimal investment time. In point
of fact, an elementary calculation produces the following result.
Lemma 1. If all the constants in the cost-minimisation problem equation 51 are assumed to be















In other words, if her current energy need is not too large, the above optimisation problem
produces an optimal investment time for the consumer. Nevertheless, notice that  , the only
explicit quantier of uncertainty in the model, is conspicuously absent from the above result.
We have addressed this puzzle in our discussion of ergodicity breaking in section 3. The
solution is to switch from the using the expected-value operator to the time-average operator









+ p0(1 − )x
e
−(−)t
 −  )
, (54)
where we once again bring in the eective trend  = −
2
/2. We further impose the requirement
that the discount rate  >  . This leads to the main result of this section, which is a straight-
forward modication of lemma 1 above, and the correct resolution of the cost-minimisation
problem posed by Hassett and Metcalf.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the price of the energy carrier pt follows a geometric Brownian
motion (,  ) such that 0 <  − 2/2. If all the other constants in equation 54, the optimisation
problem, are positive, with  <  and 0 <  < 1, the optimal time for the consumer to invest so
29
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